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When our government is spoken of as some menacing, threatening foreign entity, 
it ignores the fact that in our democracy, government is us. We, the people -- 
(applause.) We, the people, hold in our hands the power to choose our leaders and 
change our laws, and shape our own destiny.  
-- Barack Obama (2010) 
 
Most classical liberal scholars make a career in certain areas of study, and, if 
heroic, in developing public-policy argumentation. But they make a career within their 
academic profession, the ―policy community,‖ or whatever, and they remain anxious 
about their standing there. The narrowness of their professional concern is one reason 
they rarely step back and address any of the much larger questions that weigh on the 
classical liberal, questions that would likely alienate their peers and eminences. 
The momentous question weighing on the liberal is this: Presupposing that 
liberalism is enlightened, why has it not succeeded more than it has? Why, in fact, in the 
Anglosphere and elsewhere, did it fall into tatters from about 1880 onward, and never 
really make much of a comeback? Why is it that today, when communication costs are so 
low, it remains so culturally weak? If liberalism is enlightened, why aren‘t more people, 
more reliably, more faithfully finding their way to it? Why can‘t liberals enlighten more 
than they do? 
It is the presupposition necessary to motivate the question – the presupposition 
that liberalism is enlightened – that is sure to alienate any very respectable community. 
Unwilling to declare such a presupposition, liberals simply shy away from the 
momentous question. 
And there is yet another major reason why so few have taken up the momentous 
question: Once we confront it, we immediately find ourselves immersed in a whirlpool   2 
and feel ourselves drowning in torrents without beginning or end, without cause and 
effect. We can hardly swim because the torrents are not of plain water, but of varying and 
uncertain substances, partly politics, partly evolutionary psychology, partly economics, 
partly cultural dynamics, and many other parts still, and everywhere all manner of history 
– social, cultural, religious, intellectual, political, economic, and so on.  In such a swirl, 
one flails about looking for a post or harbor pile fixed below and protruding above the 
violent surface. Seeing a post, you lunge and grab hold, and try to find a way to stand 
there. From the swirling materials you begin fashioning some answers to the momentous 
question. In such a tempest, one can hardly clarify even within one‘s own mind who it is 
that one supposes to be his auditors. 
Ludwig von Mises‘s The Anti-Capitalist Mentality (2006 [1956]) declares 
liberalism enlightened and takes the identified mentality as something to be explained. 
The explanations advanced by Mises I find somewhat unimpressive. Yet the little book is 
remarkable and important for declaring the explanandum. 
I hope that these remarks may help to convey my great admiration of the new 
book by Alan S. Kahan, Mind vs. Money: The War between Intellectuals and Capitalism. 
It boldly presupposes that ―capitalism‖ is widely underappreciated, and it valiantly 
develops ideas to address why that is. In short, the intellectuals keep making up and 
spreading misunderstandings and foolishness. Here, in reviewing Kahan‘s book, I will 
take the opportunity to take the topic in some ways of my own. 
Trained at Princeton and Chicago in history, and formerly a Marxist socialist who 
changed significantly during and since his extensive studies of Tocqueville, Kahan 
commands vast learning in history and the sorts of social theory used by historians,   3 
sociologists, and leftist intellectuals generally. He boldly brings such knowledge to bear 
in telling a narrative of great proportions. The book is appealing in many ways, not least 
for the fact that Kahan openly describes his telling as a polemic (p. 23). 
The simplicity of the framing is almost astonishing. The framing is that there is 
something called ―capitalism‖ and there is a ―class‖ of actors called ―intellectuals,‖ who 
are inevitably alienated from ―capitalism.‖ Except for a brief ―honeymoon‖ period, best 
symbolized by Adam Smith, intellectuals have otherwise always and everywhere 
opposed capitalism. In the book, capitalism is also dubbed ―money,‖ and intellectuals 
―mind‖ – hence the title Mind vs. Money. 
Intellectuals are not only treated as a monolithic class, but even sometimes as a 
being living through the eons. Thus, the liberal period is a ―honeymoon,‖ after which 
time our two newlyweds, mind and money, were subsequently ―divorced‖ and lived on in 
mutual hostility. 
There are virtues to Kahan‘s simplifications. The prose is punchy. The narrative 
tours vast cultural ground, with frequent stops to tell important episodes. Here is an 
example: 
 
The Russian Revolution‘s impact was enormous. Something that had hitherto 
been a fantasy, a successful anti-capitalist revolution, had suddenly come to pass. 
It transformed intellectual opposition to capitalism from a pastime into a deadly 
form of roulette. It showed that what intellectuals said about capitalism mattered. 
   4 
[I]ntellectuals supported the Russian Revolution because it was made against 
capitalism. Hatred of the bourgeoisie, rather than any commitment to Marxism, 
was enough to make intellectuals support it. Russia had abolished capitalism, and 
intended to create an egalitarian society, and that put the communist regime on the 
side of the angels. (Kahan, 174, 176) 
 
Using the mind-vs.-money frame, Kahan supplies instructive remarks, even short 
sections, on a wide array of figures including Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, St. 
Augustine, Aquinas, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Babeuf, Hume, Smith, Proudhon, 
Tocqueville, Dickins, Marx, Bakunin, Mill, Murger, Gissing, Wilde, Morris, Ruskin, 
Arnold, Alger, Zola, Le Bon, Gide, Nietzsche, Weber, Toennies, Kautsky, Heidegger, 
Mann, Marcuse, Mournier, Horkheimer, Adorno, Foucault, Howells, Dewey, Tugwell, 
Fromm, Schumacher, and Kristol.  
Meanwhile the book contains precisely zero mentions of the following: Say, 
Bastiat, Spencer, Marshall, Lewis, George, Sumner, Mises, Nock, Rand, Hazlitt, 
Rothbard, Buchanan, and Friedman. Nor is there mention of Eastman, Chambers, Kirk, 
and Buckley. Also never mentioned are Mont Pelerin, libertarianism, the Institute of 
Economic Affairs, and the worldwide burgeoning free-market institutes and think-tanks. 
Hayek gets a single inconsequential mention. Mencken is mentioned twice, but portrayed 
simply as a mocker of capitalism. (I use the term C-word, under protest, because Kahan 
does.) 
There are glancing indications of ideological migrations, as in the cases of Silone, 
Spender, and Koestler. But Kahan essentially makes nothing of the pervasive migrations   5 
away from socialistic views. There is a very brief treatment of neo-conservatives – 
―typical intellectuals who took atypical positions‖ (236). Kahan belatedly remarks on 
page 231, ―Of course, at no time were all intellectuals ever opposed to capitalism, but the 
neocons … are a special case that demands attention.‖ Why the neocons and not the 
leading classical liberals and pro-capitalism conservatives of the past 200 years? Kahan 
never says. 
How does a sweeping book on intellectuals and capitalism leave all this out? 
Remember, after the early honeymoon period, ending ―around 1820 or 1830‖ (66), mind 
and money got divorced and ever after remained opposed. That‘s Kahan‘s story, and he 
sticks to it. 
Perhaps most warring intellectuals have warred on capitalism. But I feel surer in 
saying that most warring intellectuals have warred on other intellectuals. Class analysis 
has its uses, but merchants compete with other merchants, laborers with other laborers, 
and intellectuals with other intellectuals. In neglecting this, Kahan‘s book is sometimes 
exasperating. 
Kahan says intellectuals give capitalism a bad rap. But does Kahan explain why 
intellectuals so systematically oppose and misunderstand capitalism? Throughout the 
book Kahan develops certain traits of intellectuals. Many intellectuals have a Bohemian 
tendency, thinking of themselves as independent of ―the system,‖ or alienated from it. 
But the two traits that Kahan treats as essential and central to the story are: (1) The 
intellectual aspires to a role like that of cleric – ―intellectuals see themselves as the moral 
conscience of society‖ (p. 12); and (2) The intellectual imagines himself a sort of 
aristocrat, in a cultural if not also political sense.    6 
The two traits – clerical and aristocratic wannabeism– are related. A culture that 
takes its clerics seriously is a culture in which leading clerics enjoy a position of cultural 
leadership. Also, any aristocracy will serve functions like those served by clerics, since 
the cultural and political order is inevitably an object of some attachment and 
commitment and tradition, often reverence, and even worship. Moreover, cultural and 
political leaders, particularly leftist and fascist, might assert an encompassing experience 
and romance about government itself, a pseudo-religion with pseudo-clerics sitting in 
public office and satellite cultural institutions. ―Just as they are a pseudo-clergy, 
intellectuals are a pseudo-aristocracy‖ (14). 
Kahan‘s own leftist intellectual background is evident throughout the book, in the 
words he uses and ways he tells the story. Although Kahan gives roles to ideas, social 
developments, and historical events, his explanations of the war between intellectuals and 
capitalism revolve around matters of class interest: ―Intellectuals are attempting to take 
on the aristocratic (and clerical) role of imposing their values on society at large‖ (216). 
Yet ―[d]emocratic capitalism prevents intellectuals … from fulfilling their aristocratic 
and clerical identity. Intellects are alienated‖ (216). 
Why did the honeymoon between intellectuals and capitalism ever take place? 
Kahan explains: 
 
For the most part, however, eighteenth-century intellectuals were still relatively 
modest, at least before the French Revolution. As a nascent class still in the early 
stages of formation, they were not yet the pseudo-aristocracy they would become 
– their pretensions were not yet that great. … Intellectuals‘ pro-capitalism had   7 
been fueled to some extent by their resentment of the rank, privileges, and status 
of the aristocracy. To put it baldly, since capitalism undermined aristocracy, it 
was a good thing from an intellectual‘s point of view. (83, 88) 
 
Hmm. It does not seem to me that an interest in bringing down a culturally rival 
class would have been a major factor in Adam Smith‘s decisions as to the ideas he would 
take stock in, develop, and promote. Still, Kahan‘s idea is provocative. Perhaps the 
cultural interests of contending classes – ―intellectuals‖ versus ―old regime‖ – was a 
factor in making the conditions favorable to the ideas of the Scottish intellectuals. But 
perhaps those ideas blossomed from other motives, such as the love of liberal norms and 
enlightenment, motives that prevailed (to the extent they did) because contending baser 
motives were unusually weak at that time and place.  
 And why did the divorce take place? ―The most important reason for the outbreak 
of war between mind and money was the full emergence of the intellectual class‖ (85). 
―Once the traditional aristocracy had been put into the shade by rising middle classes, the 
situation was different. Now, rather than diminishing the status of their rivals, the old 
aristocracy, capitalism was the support of a new rival, the businessman‖ (88). ―Whether 
the bourgeoisie was the ruling class in nineteenth-century Europe (probably not) is not 
the issue, what matters is that they were perceived to be by people like Karl Marx. Many 
nineteenth-century intellectuals, not just Marx, saw the bourgeois as the new, and newly 
dominant, enemy‖ (89). ―Hostility grew over time, gathering momentum until 1880 or so, 
when it was firmly established‖ (84). Meanwhile, the ―proletariat provided a class of 
victims on whose behalf intellectuals could fight‖ (88).    8 
Kahan‘s treatment is much richer than these few quotations, and he points out 
differences in the American scene (90), but the quotations provide the mainline of the 
story of the honeymoon and the divorce. Going forward, ―[t]he new understanding of 
capitalism as antagonistic to equality was so strong that it soon became unimaginable that 
it had once meant greater equality‖ (90-91). The literature and intellectual culture grew 
increasingly anti-capitalist. ―The capitalist‘s reputation became what it remains today‖ 
(130). 
Kahan‘s chapters on the twentieth century and ―recent battles,‖ including anti-
Americanism, anti-globalization, and environmentalism, brim with insights on a great 
variety of illiberal intellectuals, but I pass over it all except to share this quotation: ―The 
‗60s saw the arrival of sex, drugs, rock ‗n‘ roll, and youth culture. … [T]he 
counterculture was sometimes political, but always opposed to capitalism‖ (226). For a 
view that accentuates the libertarian elements of the so-called counterculture, see 
Riggenbach (1998). 
Kahan‘s war between mind and money reaches back to Plato, and it has 
proceeded without respite for nearly 200 years. For 250 pages – apart from some initial 
anticipation – it had seemed that Kahan defined intellectuals as wannabe clerics and 
aristocrats, criticized them for their greed, and consigned them to alienation from 
capitalism. Yet in the last chapter Kahan proposes that intellectuals ―give peace a chance‖ 
(291). Society needs intellectuals to play cleric. I agree, but the shift struck me as 
incongruous. The clerical/aristocratic wannabeism goes suddenly from being a scandal to 
being an understandable and even laudable aspiration.    9 
What Kahan calls for is simply ―détente,‖ a truce. Apparently Kahan wouldn‘t 
think of asking intellectuals to actually understand and affirm classical liberalism. He 
only calls on them to temper their animosity, to reconcile themselves with commerce and 
markets, and to supply the demand for meaning and moral interpretation and instruction. 
―Rather than attempting to get rid of capitalism, reformed intellectuals can supplement 
capitalism‘s enlightened self-interest with a wider moral perspective‖ (282). ―By 
participating in society‘s general education, the entire intellectual class can improve 
capitalism. By accepting that this is their role, they become its loyal opposition‖ (288). I 
would submit that we have here examples of why we should avoid the C-word. 
Kahan is not the first to treat intellectuals as a class, but he takes that frame and 
develops it through the ages in addressing the momentous question of why classical-
liberal enlightenment is not more successful. His interpretations might have 
shortcomings, but they also provide an overarching narrative of considerable power and 
insight. The book is a great contribution to literature on the fortunes of free-market 
capitalism. 
If I could supplement Kahan‘s book, I would suggest a couple of ideas. 
In the chapter on the eighteenth-century, Kahan writes: ―Rousseau‘s ideas were 
considered amusing intellectual fantasies by many, perhaps most of his readers. But 
intellectuals‘ egalitarian dreams have a way of taking on reality‖ (56). What is it that 
makes certain dreams more seductive than others?  
I am very attracted to the epic narrative of human history that one can draw out of 
various writers, especially Hayek (1978, 1979, 1988), as well as Paul Rubin (2002, 
2003). It is a narrative that starts with the Paleolithic band. Its nature, epistemics,   10 
mentality, sentiments, and ethos are in our genes. Agriculture, settled society, and the 
development of tribes and nations ―came late in our existence as humans—probably too 
late to have left a significant mark on our evolved preferences or intellects‖ (Rubin 2002, 
161). New learning about ―the 10,000 year explosion‖ (Cochran and Harpending 2009) 
notwithstanding, we may presume that today the genetic make-up of the entire family of 
humankind remains basically like that of those in the Upper Paleolithic ending about 
10,000 years ago. That genetic make-up evolved over millions of years to work in small, 
closed, enduring, inward-looking, solidaric circles of 20-100 people. The unsubtle mind 
of band-man sees society as organizational, not a network of spontaneous relationships. It 
yearns for an encompassing coordination of sentiment, not a cosmos of intersecting 
romances. It yearns for common knowledge, and is uncomfortable with disjointed 
knowledge. It yearns for social justice, and is not satisfied with merely procedural or 
commutative justice. It presupposes a configuration of collective ownership, not one of 
individual ownership. As the band passed to the tribe and the nation, the unsubtle mind 
was taught restraint, social hierarchy, and increasing complexity, and the closed society 
of the tribe and the nation eventually developed into the open society, and ideas of the 
subtle mind flowered in the 17
th and 18
th century and developed into what would be 
called liberalism. But the liberty principle brought a ―great transformation‖ (K. Polanyi 
1944), and a great reaction that found its way back to the unsubtle Paleolithic mentalities 
and ethos. The great magic was democracy, as was noted by Tocqueville (1969, 690-
695). Democratic superstitions both seduce cultural leaders themselves and allow them to 
play on certain instincts of their supporters, instincts of egalitarian solidarity and the 
unsubtle mentality. The social democratic cultural reaction made a chaos of liberal   11 
semantic and stomped on liberal norms and rules. Hayek (1978) wrote a paper called 
―The Atavism of Social Justice,‖ but he sketched a much broader story of the paleo-
atavism of social democracy:  
Who then observing this encounter [between Hume and Rousseau] would have 
believed that it would be the ideas of Rousseau and not those of Hume which 
would govern the political development of the next two hundred years? Yet this is 
what happened. It was the Rousseauesque idea of democracy, his still thoroughly 
rationalist conceptions of the social contract and of popular sovereignty, which 
were to submerge the ideals of liberty under the law and government limited by 
law. It was Rousseau and not Hume who fired the enthusiasm of the successive 
revolutions which created modern government on the Continent and guided the 
decline of the ideals of the older liberalism and the approach to totalitarian 
democracy in the whole world. (Hayek 1967 [1963], 120) 
 
In Kahan‘s book, there is nothing about our genetic inheritance, about the social-
democratic cultural reaction as an atavistic assertion of primordial yearnings and 
mentalities, although consonant chords are struck in many passages (34-61, 109, 129, 
134, 136, 146-149, 213). 
Finally, I would like to offer some remarks relating to Kahan‘s treatment of 
intellectuals as clerics, and why some of their tendencies are statist.  
Smith and Hayek said that, by and large, beyond our local setting we lack the 
knowledge to make our benevolence effective. Smith and Hayek helped to formulate and 
establish a web of verities, by-and-large truths, intended to establish a presumption of 
liberty, a presumption that we don‘t know enough to intervene beneficially. The 
underlining character of their liberal philosophy is one of humility. Now, as scholars, we 
may illustrate the verities, but adding yet another illustration of them is really of marginal 
significance. We may try to deflate any of the myriad hubristic contraventions of the 
liberty principle, but such work is largely of a critical nature. Enlightenment thus does not   12 
make for a ―progressive research program,‖ in the sense of an epistemic conquering of 
the cosmos. Moreover, it does not fit the image of science as precise and accurate. People 
who avoid what Hayek (1989 [1974]) in his Nobel address called ―the pretence of 
knowledge‖ can, certainly, live a scholarly life, but a contemplative and critical sort of 
life, one out of step with academia in a number of significant ways. 
Liberal intellectuals have a crucial role to play in the clerical function. They can 
help the individual in his or her search for meaning by teaching certain broad frames 
within which meaning is sought and found. In the individual‘s living context of meaning, 
however, little can be gotten from liberal intellectuals. Their chief value consists in 
telling the individual where not to look.  
To store energy, evolution selected for a penchant for sweets, and we learn to 
subdue that now-troublesome penchant with the help of institutions like Weight 
Watchers. Evolution also selected for penchants that since the end of the 19
th century 
have too often indulged themselves with social democracy, and to meet the kind of duties 
drawn out for us by Adam Smith we need State Watchers. Look elsewhere in the life-
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